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Abstract
This paper presents a comparison of social kinship (patrilineage) and biological kinship (genetic
relatedness) in predicting cooperative relationships in two different economic contexts in the
fishing and whaling village of Lamalera, Indonesia. A previous analysis of boat crew affiliation
data collected in the village in 1999 found that social kinship (patrilineage) was a better predictor
of crew affiliation than was genetic kinship. A replication of this analysis using similar data
collected in 2006 finds the same pattern: lineage is a better predictor than genetic kinship of crew
affiliation, and the two together explain little additional variance over that explained by lineage
alone. However, an analogous test on food-sharing relationships finds the opposite pattern:
biological kinship is a better predictor of food-sharing relationships than is social kinship. The
difference between these two cooperative contexts is interpreted in terms of kin preferences that
shape partner choice, and the relative autonomy with which individuals can seek to satisfy those
preferences. Drawing on stable matching theory, it is suggested that unilineal descent may serve as
a stable compromise among multiple individuals’ incongruent partner preferences, with patriliny
favored over matriliny in the crew-formation context because it leads to higher mean degrees of
relatedness among male cooperators. In the context of food-sharing, kin preferences can be
pursued relatively autonomously, without the necessity of coordinating preferences with those of
other households through the institution of lineage.
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Hamilton’s (1964) theory of inclusive fitness, or kin selection, proposes that altruistic
behaviors—those that benefit another at an expense to the actor—may be favored by natural
selection if the recipients of the altruistic act are likely to share the alleles for the prosocial
behavior with the altruist because of common descent. The condition under which altruism
can evolve by kin selection is referred to as “Hamilton’s Rule,” commonly expressed as rb >
c, where b is the fitness benefit to the recipient, c is the fitness cost to the altruist, and r is
Wright’s (1922) coefficient of relatedness between the altruist and the recipient, a measure
of the probability that two individuals will share alleles for some trait because of descent
from a common ancestor. Much depends on the ratio of benefits to costs, but under most
circumstances kin selection predicts that individuals will favor closer kin over more distant
kin, and distant kin over unrelated individuals.
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The ubiquity of unilineal descent systems in human societies may appear inconsistent with
the predictions of kin selection. Bilateral kinship systems closely follow biological
genealogies and would appear to be more consistent with individuals’ inclusive fitness
interests. In contrast, unilineal systems exclude half of one’s biological kin—those related
through either one’s mother or one’s father. One might legitimately ask, as have critics of
biological approaches to kinship (e.g., Sahlins 1976; Schneider 1984), if human behaviors
toward kin have been shaped by natural selection, why have so many societies opted for
systems of descent that would appear contrary to their predicted interests?
In response to this problem, a number of adaptive hypotheses for the origin and persistence
of unilineal descent systems have been proposed. These hypotheses fall into two categories:
those that attempt to explain a specific mode of unilineal descent (either patriliny or
matriliny), and those that attempt to explain unilineality more generally. The former have
tended to focus on the biological mechanisms of inheritance and differences in variance in
reproductive success of sons and daughters. The latter have tended to focus on the
advantages of unilineality as an institution of economic and social organization.
Hartung (1976) proposed one of the earliest adaptive hypotheses for the origin of patriliny.
He suggested that patriliny may be favored because wealth directed to sons can have a
greater effect on fitness than wealth directed toward daughters, as a consequence of the
higher variance in reproductive success among males compared with females. Greater
reproductive skew among males than females also means that patrilineally related kin may
be on average more related than matrilineally related kin: where polygyny exists, more
individuals share fathers (as half-siblings) than share mothers (Chagnon 1979; Hughes
1988). (A further explanation [Hartung 1976, 1977] for patriliny—that men favor
investment in their male descendants because of the additional relatedness to them granted
by a shared Y-chromosome—has been largely disregarded.)
Early adaptive explanations for matriliny, on the other hand, hinged on paternity uncertainty.
In societies where paternity confidence is particularly low (<0.268; Greene 1978), a man
may be probabilistically more closely related to his sister’s child than his own, favoring
investment in his sister’s children (Alexander 1974; Flinn 1981; Greene 1978). Such levels
of paternity confidence appear implausibly low for human societies. In response to this
criticism, Hartung (1981) calculated that after several generations and at more plausible
levels of paternity confidence a manmay be probabilistically more related to a matrilineal
heir than a patrilineal heir because of the compounding effects of paternity uncertainty
across generations. However, these benefits take several generations before they are
realized, and others (e.g., Holden et al. 2003) have questioned whether such a long-term
strategy could persist in the face of the short-term advantages of investing in direct
descendants. Consequently, paternity confidence alone is now considered an insufficient
explanation for matriliny.
When the focus is withdrawn from fathers’ interests, then others’ preferences for matriliny
becomes evident. Grandmothers and grandfathers both are probabilistically more closely
related to their daughters’ children than to their sons’ at any level of paternity confidence
less than one (Flinn 1981; Hartung 1985; Holden et al. 2003). Though higher variance in
male reproductive success may bias inheritance toward sons (Hartung 1976), this advantage
must be weighed against the probability that one’s son’s purported children may not be his.
Holden et al. (2003) have calculated that when the ratio of the fitness benefit of investing in
daughters to the benefit of investing in sons exceeds the probability of paternity confidence,
then daughter-biased investment may be favored, resulting in matriliny. Their model appears
consistent with two correlates of matriliny: lower paternity confidence and modes of
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subsistence, such as horticulture, that disfavor resource-holding polygyny (see also Mattison
2011).
General explanations for unilineal descent systems have focused on their economic and
institutional benefits. Social anthropologists have long recognized unilineal descent as an
institution for organizing large corporate groups (see Kuper 1982 for a review). Placing this
observation in an adaptive framework, van den Berghe (1979) has pointed out the need to
organize large, clearly defined groups with mutually exclusive memberships for purposes of
collective action. Individuals’ bilateral kin groups may overlap but are not perfectly
congruent, except those of full siblings. Unilineal descent defines congruent kin sets for all
individuals related by common descent through one sex (Murdock 1949). It also simplifies
coordination by defining a set of individuals who share the same norms governing
cooperation (Alvard 2003). These benefits of collective action may outweigh the costs of
excluding half of one’s kin. Using population genetics models, Jones (2000) suggests that
the effective degree of relatedness among such closed groups of cooperating kin may be
elevated.
Taking a different approach, Palmer and Steadman (1997) have proposed that human
kinship systems serve as descendant-leaving strategies that maximize the inclusive fitness
interests of ancestors. Invoking Trivers’s (1974) theory of parent-offspring conflict, they
begin by noting that parents have an interest in reducing conflict and promoting altruism
among their offspring. Similarly, grandparents have an interest in promoting altruism among
all their grandchildren, even though those grandchildren may prefer to favor their own
siblings over their cousins. Over time, these ancestral preferences and parental admonitions
expand to encompass larger groups of related descendants and become formalized cultural
traditions.
Building on this work, Quinlan and Flinn (2005) suggest that unilineal descent systems
serve ancestors’ inclusive-fitness interests by focusing the inheritance of durable resources.
Unilineal norms of inheritance may, for example, constrain an heir from sharing access to or
the benefits from an inherited resource with his non-lineage kin. This ensures the benefits of
those resources accrue to the ancestor’s descendants and are not dispersed among non-
descendants. In this way, Quinlan and Flinn argue, unilineal descent systems may benefit the
inclusive fitness interests of the bequeathing ancestor even at the expense of the interests of
the heir. The hypotheses proposed by Palmer and Steadman (1997) and Quinlan and Flinn
(2005) are interesting, but it is unclear how exactly ancestors are able to enforce such
inheritance norms, and why heirs might persist in observing them even against their own
interests.
The key question addressed in this paper is to what degree lineage systems actually
constrain individuals from pursuing their inclusive fitness interests. Under such systems are
people genuinely hindered from directing aid to biological kin outside their lineage? A few
studies have statistically compared social kinship (that is, kinship as culturally defined
according to the system of descent) and biological kinship (that is, probabilistic genetic
relatedness through common descent) as predictors of affiliative behavior. Chagnon and
Bugos’s (1979) study of the division of a group of men into two factions during an axe fight
among the Yanomamö of Venezuela showed that genetic kinship rather than lineage
membership appeared to predict faction membership. A recent reanalysis of these data
(Alvard 2009) using network regression methods supports this finding. Hawkes (1983)
compared the effects of social kinship categories with genealogical relatedness in predicting
garden labor help in the bilateral Highland New Guinea community of Binumarien. Her
results showed that social kin ties were better predictors of garden help than were genetic
ties, though the two were themselves strongly correlated. Alvard (2003) compared shared
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lineage membership and genetic relatedness as predictors of shared boat crew membership
for a group of men in the patrilineal village of Lamalera, Indonesia (the population
considered in the present study). His results showed a stronger effect for social kinship than
for biological kinship, and when combined together, biological kinship predicted little
additional variance beyond that predicted by social kinship alone. Collectively, these few
results do not provide any clear pattern, but instead they suggest the degree to which
behavior follows social rather than biological kinship can vary depending on the setting and
society.
Where a propensity to cooperate with kin is found, it is not necessarily an indication that kin
selection is the mechanism promoting the cooperative behavior. Other mechanisms, such as
synergistic mutualism (Maynard Smith 1983) or reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971), may
maintain the cooperative behavior, and kin selection in these contexts may instead be acting
to shape partner choice (Noë and Hammerstein 1994, 1995). Partner choice is an important
aspect of cooperative interactions that has only recently begun to receive attention. For
example, partner choice is central to models of competitive altruism (Barclay and Willer
2007; Chiang 2010; Roberts 1998). Given that cooperation is favored in a particular setting,
the question of who cooperates with whom also has important adaptive consequences for
behavior. If potential partners vary in characteristics that affect the payoffs to cooperation,
then natural selection may select for preferences that lead to adaptive choices.
Two examples come from recent studies of food sharing. In their analysis of food sharing
among the reservation Ache, Allen-Arave et al. (2008) found that genetic kin are preferred
exchange partners. Inconsistent with the predictions of kin-selection, kin with greater “need”
(defined by the difference in productivitybetween the two households) did not receive more
food. Instead, households that exchanged more were more closely related. They suggest that
an apparent preference for kin as reciprocal partners may not be motivated by kin selection
per se, but instead may be because kin are more likely to have qualities that are valued in
reciprocal partners, such as trust or familiarity resulting from a history of past interactions as
well as a higher probability of future interaction. Nolin (2010) found a similar preference for
kin as reciprocal partners in the Lamaleran food-sharing network data presented here. While
kinship alone explained a modest amount of variation in sharing relationships, it explained
little additional variation beyond that explained by reciprocity, and as the degree of
relatedness between households increased, so did the propensity to reciprocate.
Reconsiderations of evidence of kin selection in nonhuman animals have similarly
concluded that direct fitness benefits resulting from mutualism or reciprocal altruism may be
more important than indirect fitness benefits in predicting some cooperative behaviors
previously attributed to kin selection (Chapais 2001; Clutton-Brock 2002; Griffin and West
2002).
What studies like these suggest is that close attention must be paid when invoking kin
selection as an explanation for cooperative behavior. Are indirect fitness benefits promoting
the cooperative behavior in question, or is kin preference instead acting as a partner choice
mechanism in a cooperative setting better explained by some other adaptive mechanism
providing direct fitness benefits? This is not to say that inclusive fitness is unimportant in
settings of partner choice—it may very well be that kin are preferred partners because of the
additional inclusive fitness dividend realized from cooperating with closely related kin
compared with others (Wrangham 1982) and that kin selection has driven the evolution of
the preference. However, it does not necessarily follow that the cooperative behavior in
question is favored by natural selection solely because of the inclusive fitness benefits
realized (Griffin and West 2002).
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The study presented here tests the relative degree to which people’s partner choices are
shaped by social and biological kinship in the context of two cooperative subsistence
activities in the village of Lamalera, Indonesia. The first context is the formation of whale
boat hunting crews. This portion of the analysis replicates, using data collected in 2006,
Alvard’s (2003) analysis of crew affiliation data collected in 1999. The second context is the
network of between-household food-sharing relationships in the village in 2006. It is
important to note that the analysis presented here is not a test of kin selection as a
mechanism maintaining cooperation in these two economic settings. Previous research
suggests that cooperative hunting in Lamalera is maintained through mutualism (Alvard and
Nolin 2002) and food sharing is primarily maintained by reciprocity (Nolin 2010). Instead,
the test is, which model of kinship—the biological or the social—provides the better model
of people’s partner preferences in these cooperative contexts?
Site Description
Lamalera is located on the island of Lembata, east of Flores and north of Timor, in Nusa
Tenggara Timur province of southeast Indonesia. In July 2006, the studypopulation
consisted of 1,227 people residing in 317 households.1 The village stretches along 1.7 km of
steep and rocky coastline on either side of the beach that is the center of economic activity in
the village. Lamalerans speak Lamaholot, a language ranging from east Flores through
central Lembata, and share many cultural features with their Lamaholot-speaking neighbors.
All residents except the very young or very aged also speak Indonesian, the national
language. Like most of the region, Lamalera is Roman Catholic.
Lamalerans are maritime foragers who fish and hunt seasonally over the course of the year.
Sperm whales, other toothed cetaceans, and three species of ray are hunted from traditional
paddle-and-sail-powered boats called téna. The active hunting season, called léfa, runs from
May through September of each year. Economic activity during the remainder of the year
consists of fishing from small boats, primarily for flying fish using gill nets, though some
small-boat fishing persists during léfa as well. In recent years, motor boats, called jonson
after a common brand of outboard motor, have seen increasing use. These boats are not used
to pursue whales, but instead are used to pursue smaller, swifter prey including ray, tuna,
marlin, and porpoise. In 2006, téna and jonson were used side by side in a mixed foraging
strategy: téna were used when whales had been sighted or were otherwise expected in the
area, and jonson were otherwise used.
The steep and rocky terrain surrounding Lamalera discourages agriculture. Instead,
vegetable foods are acquired through trade with agriculturalists from the interior of the
island. Women from Lamalera exchange fish and whale meat for staples such as maize,
bananas, manioc, and rice, as well as other fruits and vegetables, brought by women from
other villages to a weekly market. Other sources of food include chickens, pigs, goats, and
dogs kept by Lamalerans. Consumption of livestock is largely reserved for ceremonial
occasions associated with marriages, deaths, and the building and repair of boats.
Kinship in Lamalera is patrilineal. Each clan or suku consists of one to five lineages, each
associated with its own great house or lango béla. In 2006, 21 endogenous clans and 39
lineages were represented in the village. Lineages ranged from 4 to 69 members, and from 1
to 20 households. In addition, 55 exogenous clans were represented among outsiders who
had married into the village and the few families of immigrant schoolteachers who had taken
1This figure excludes the populations of the outlying agricultural hamlets of Lamamanu and Korkowolor, which the Indonesian
government includes under the administration of Lamalera. Also excluded are 18 students from other villages residing in the junior
high school dormitory, three resident priests, and their housekeeper.
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up posts in Lamalera. Marriage in the village nominally follows a pattern of asymmetric
marriage alliance among clans, though in practice the prescribed system is not always
followed (Barnes 1996). Brideprice was traditionally paid in ivory but is now paid in cash
(when paid at all). Postmarital residence is neolocal, reflecting a twentieth-century change
from virilocal residence promoted by the church. A groom is expected to have built or
secured a house for himself and his bride before marriage, though saturation of the preferred
sites in this steep and rocky village means the new home may be some distance from either
the bride’s or groom’s parents. Consequently, residential distance and (biological) kinship
are only weakly correlated (Pearson’s r = −0.075).
Cooperative Hunting and Crew Formation
Lineages are the primary means of coordinating economic activity in the village (Alvard
2003; Alvard and Nolin 2002). In the past, most lineage great houses were associated with
the hunting boat, or téna, belonging to that lineage, though today many lineages do not have
téna of their own. In 2006 there were 14 active téna operating in the village,2 compared with
20 in 1999. Téna are “owned” by a corporation of individuals who hold share-rights or umã
in any prey caught by virtue of underwriting the costs of construction and maintenance.
Most corporate shareholders come from the lineage associated with that boat, though some
shareholders, especially of minor types of corporate shares, may come from other clans or
lineages. Several craftsmen, including the harpoon smith, the sail maker, and the master
carpenter, are also entitled to shares of the catch, as are the harpooner and crewmen present
on the boat on the day of a successful hunt. The specific portions assigned to individuals are
governed by a complex system of norms based on the anatomy of the prey species. These
norms, as well as estimates of typical share sizes, are described in greater detail by Alvard
(2002).
Each téna is managed by a boat master or téna alep. Before the start of each hunting season,
the téna alep will visit men in the village and try to secure commitments from them to crew
on his boat during the coming léfa. Men generally join the crew of their own lineage but will
sometimes join the crew of their mother’s or wife’s lineage (Alvard 2003). Although
households holding corporate shares are by no means obligated to provide crew, they are
likely to experience pressure from the téna alep and possibly others within their lineage if
there are able-bodied men in the household. Households holding corporate shares may have
an added incentive to provide crew because they will receive both their corporate share and
a crew share from any prey caught; however, holding a corporate share in one boat and
crewing on another can be an attractive strategy for reducing risk.
Jonson are comparatively new institutions, but most follow the téna model of organization.
Each jonson is headed by a boat master or jonson alep, and a corporation of members hold
share-rights in any prey caught. Commonly the boat master is the owner of the outboard
motor, and the boat corporation members bear the costs of constructing and maintaining the
boat itself. Like téna, jonson corporations are typically drawn from a single lineage, but in
some cases they may also include a collection of close neighbors. There were 15 active
jonson in 2006, compared with just two in 1999.
Although some effort is put into organizing committed crews before the start of the active
hunting season, in practice crew formation is far more fluid (Alvard 2003). Men descend to
the beach shortly after dawn each day and gather near the boat house of the boat they intend
to join. Téna require a minimum crew of eight, including the harpooner, but in 2006 they
had an average crew of 10.2 men. Jonson can be crewed by as few as four individuals but
2“Active” here is defined as having had at least one successful hunt during the hunting season in 2006.
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have an average crew of 8.5 men. As crews are assembled, the boats are pushed out to sea. If
a boat fails to assemble the minimum crew required (or has no harpooner), those men who
have assembled will disperse and may join other crews for the day. Jonson appear less prone
to this type of “coordinationfailure” (Alvard and Nolin 2002), but they may stay beached for
extended periods if the motor breaks or if fuel runs out. The net effect is that while most
boats tend to have a stable core group of crew members, there is also considerable overlap in
crew participation between boats over the course of the active hunting season.
Food Sharing
Households have a number of options for dispensing with the shares they acquire from téna
or jonson. Some portion will be consumed immediately. Part of the remainder may be
preserved for weeks or even months by salting and drying it in the sun. Trade is one of the
primary economic activities of women in Lamalera, and a portion of the catch may be traded
at a weekly market (Barnes 1996; Barnes and Barnes 1989). A household can convert the fat
and protein calories in meat and fish into carbohydrate calories by trading for maize, which
can be stored for years.
As is common in settings where resource packages are large and asynchronously acquired,
households in Lamalera commonly share some of their acquired food with other households.
Such sharing helps alleviate harvest risk and reduces temporal variance in diet (Nolin 2008;
Winterhalder 1986). Between-household gifts of food are called bĕfãnã. The size of typical
portions given varies with the prey species (Nolin 2008: Table 4.10) but is typically enough
to provide one meal’s worth of meat or fish for the recipient household. Notably, vegetable
foods are also shared, possibly because their acquisition covaries with the fishery harvest. In
2006, vegetable foods accounted for about a quarter of all transfers by frequency (Nolin
2008). Prepared foods are sometimes shared as well.
Unlike the primary distribution of prey among normatively recognized holders of share-
rights, this secondary distribution of food between households is not governed by any
formalized set of norms dictating, for instance, classes of individuals to whom one must
give. The giving of bĕfãnã is voluntary and discretionary, with both husbands and wives
participating in sharing decisions. When other adults are resident in the household, they may
also participate in these decisions. Relatives and neighbors are the most common donors and
recipients (Nolin 2010). Repeated sharing occurs to and from a core set of households, with
occasional “singleton” transfers to and from other households (Nolin 2008). Previous
analyses have shown that the single greatest predictor of whether a household shares with
another is reciprocal sharing from the potential recipient, while kinship and proximity
appear primarily to shape preference among reciprocal partners (Nolin 2010).
Methods
Crew Participation
Field research was conducted from April through December of 2006. Each day during léfa
from May 8 through September 9, 2006, local assistants observed the return of all large
boats (téna and jonson).3 The names and roles of men participatingin boat crews were
recorded into notebooks as each boat returned. These books were collected and the data
entered into the project database on a weekly basis, allowing the author to monitor the
quality of the data collected as the project progressed. Over the course of the observation
period there were 907 hunts over 88 hunt-days. A total of 6,870 man-days were recorded.
All but 90 of these records could be positively matched to individuals listed in residents’
3Boats do not go out on Sundays or religious holidays. No data were collected on May 12 and 13.
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genealogies (see below). There were 300 unique men identified among the remaining 6,780
records.
This sample of crew participation data was used to replicate a portion of Alvard’s (2003)
analysis. Following Alvard’s procedure (2003:136-137), the sample was first reduced to the
271 men who were residents of Lamalera during the study period. This primarily excluded
Lamaleran émigrés who participated in hunts during return visits to Lamalera. The sample
was further reduced to the 255 men for whom genealogies including all four grandparents
were available. This procedure primarily excluded individuals with one or more immigrant
ancestors, but it was necessary to ensure higher precision in calculations of genetic
relatedness (see below). The sample was again reduced to those 253 men for whom lineage
was known. Finally, following Alvard (2003), a sample of “regular hunters” was drawn by
retaining only those men who contributed six or more hunt-days.4 This final sample of 215
regular hunters contributed 6,049 or 88% of all observed man-days.
A 215×215 affiliation matrix was created from the final sample of 6,049 man-days
contributed by the 215 regular hunters. Each cell in the affiliation matrix contains the
number of days the pair of men of the corresponding row and column were listed together as
crew on the same boat. However, not all men contributed the same number of man-days
over the course of the hunting season. It is possible that some pairs of men appear to affiliate
more frequently simply because they contributed more effort. Following the procedure used
by Alvard (2003), the affiliation matrix was normalized by fitting homogenous margins of
100 man-days for all hunters using iterative proportional fitting or IPF (Bishop et al. 1975).5
The diagonal of the affiliation matrix is undefined, so structural zeroes were assigned along
the diagonal; other zero-value cells in the affiliation matrix were assigned a small, positive
value of 0.0001 before fitting (Freeman et al. 1992). The IPF procedure was performed in R
2.10.1 (R Development Core Team 2009) using the loglin function of the stats package. The
resulting matrix provides a measure of affiliation for each of the 23,005 unique, unordered
pairs formed by the 215 regular hunters, normalized for variation in participation among
hunters. In the language of social network analysis, the resulting matrix describes a network
of undirected, valued ties of shared crew affiliation. For simplicity, this matrix is referred to
as the crew affiliation matrix in the discussion below.
Food Sharing
Following the end of léfa all 317 households were interviewed about their usual food-
sharing habits over the preceding hunting season. These interviews treated the household as
the unit of analysis, and any adult residents present in the household at the time of the
interview were allowed to respond. A previous phase of the study (see Nolin 2008:141-144)
suggested that repeated transfers to or from the same households accounted for most food
sharing, with single transfers to or from other households accounting for the remainder. In
pretesting, respondents were reluctant to rank other households according to the frequency
with which they gave or received. Consequently, the question was reworded to elicit only
those repeat donors and recipients who accounted for the greatest frequency of sharing.
Respondents were asked to name those other households to whom they had “usually, more
than once” given food during the preceding season, as well as those from whom they had
“usually, more than once” received food over the same period. The order of these two
4Six days constitute a full work week in Lamalera, so this cutoff includes only those men who contributed at least one week’s worth
of labor to the fishery.
5Another method of normalizing the matrix is to express each pair’s affiliation as the proportion of days that both men chose to go
hunting that they also crewed on the same boat—that is, the number of times they crewed together over opportunities to do so. The
resulting matrix is highly correlated (r=0.895) with the matrix derived using IPF. Results using this alternative matrix do not
qualitatively differ from those obtained using the IPF matrix. I present the results using the IPF matrix here primarily to facilitate
comparison with Alvard’s (2003) results.
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questions was alternated from interview to interview. No limit was placed on the number of
nominations.
By asking households to report both giving and receiving relationships, this design censused
all possible directed sharing relationships between households twice. To reduce Type II
(false negative) errors resulting from faulty respondent recall, these two sets of responses
were combined by taking the logical union of the sets of reported giving and receiving
relationships (Nolin 2008). This produced a social network of binary, directed food-sharing
relationships among households in the village. Additional details on these sharing data, how
they were collected, and the rationale for the approach used in creating the network are
provided elsewhere (Nolin 2010). The resulting network consists of 3,111 directed, binary
sharing relationships out of the 100,172 possible ordered pairs among the 317 households in
the village. This network is referred to as the food-sharing matrix in the discussion below.
Relatedness and Lineage
Genealogies on all household residents were collected as part of household interviews. In
many cases, these interviews consisted of asking respondents to verify genealogies
previously collected by Alvard’s team in 1999, which had been further extended using
parish baptismal registers. Informants were asked to provide genealogies as far back as their
grandparents’ generation.6 Where possible these genealogies were verified and extended
using data from local parish registers. Wright’s (1922) coefficient of relatedness was
calculated from these genealogies for each pair of residents using Descent, version 0.2.0.2
(Hagen 2005).7 For genealogiescomplete to the grandparents’ generation, the minimum
detectable degree of relatedness is r≥0.0625 (one shared grandparent or closer); for many
pairs of individuals in this dataset a higher-resolution calculation was possible. Respondents
were also asked to provide the clan and lineage of all household residents. A few lineages
are now so small that they no longer maintain a great house of their own and instead have
merged with other lineages. For the purposes of this analysis, lineage was defined by the
great house an individual attended for lineage functions rather than by the name of his or her
historical lineage.
Several matrices were constructed from the genealogical and lineage data. For the analysis
of crew affiliation, a 215×215 matrix indicating the degree of relatedness between regular
hunters was constructed. Each cell of this matrix was populated with the estimated
coefficient of relatedness between the pair of men defined by the corresponding row and
column. This matrix is referred to as the hunter relatedness matrix in discussions below. The
mean degree of relatedness among all 23,005 unique (unordered) hunter pairs was low,
r=0.0071. Closely related kin were sparse in this pool of hunters: only 1,718 dyads, or 7.5%,
had any detectible (given the completeness of the genealogical data) degree of relatedness;
2.1% (475 dyads) were related by r≥0.125, 1.1% (251 dyads) were related by r≥0.25, and
0.6% (137 dyads) were related by r≥0.5.
Similarly, a 215×215 matrix indicating shared lineage between pairs of men was
constructed. The cell values of this matrix were coded as 1 if the two men were from the
same lineage, and as 0 otherwise. This matrix is referred to as the hunter shared lineage
6The majority (1,049 of 1,227) of residents’ genealogies are complete at least as far as their grandparents’ generation. Of the
remaining 178 residents, all but 18 are incomplete because they themselves, or one or both of their parents, immigrated from outside
the village (in which case additional ancestors were not recorded beyond the immigrating generation) or because they were born to an
unmarried woman and so their father and paternal grandparents are unknown. The remaining 18 cases of incomplete genealogies are
those of elderly individuals whose children were only able to provide the names of their parents’ parents.
7These calculations assumed all children to be the biological offspring of their putative father.
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matrix. Of the 23,005 unique (unordered) pairs of hunters, 745, or 3.2%, were of the same
lineage.
Similar matrices were generated for the analysis of the 317×317 household-by-household
food-sharing network. However, unlike the crew affiliation network, which consists of
dyads of hunters, the sharing network consists of dyads of households. This complicates
calculating a measure of between household relatedness. Ethnographic observations of the
distribution of bĕfãnã suggest that both husbands and wives take part in sharing decisions.
For this reason, between-household relatedness was calculated relative to both the husband
and wife of the donor household. First, the maximum degree of relatedness to any single
individual in the recipient (column) household was calculated separately for the husband and
wife of the donor (row) household. Then the husband’s and wife’s values were compared
and the greater of the two values was used to populate the cells of the matrix.8 For
simplicity, this matrix is referred to as the household relatedness matrix.
As with the hunter relatedness matrix, average between-household relatedness is relatively
low and kin are sparse in this network. The mean degree of between-household relatedness
is r=0.016. Of the 100,172 directed household dyads (ordered household pairs), 12,595 or
12.6% have any detectible degree of relatedness. Only 4.1% (4,125) of directed dyads are as
closely related as first cousins (r≥0.125); only 2.1% (2,070 directed dyads) are as closely
related as r≥0.25, and only 0.9% (917 directed dyads) are as closely related as r≥0.5.
Because descent in Lamalera is reckoned patrilineally, it might seem intuitive to assign each
household to the lineage of the husband of that household. However, such an assignment
overlooks the fact that patrilines have both male and female members. Each household may
be associated with two lineages: that of the husband and that of the wife. In Lamalera, where
women contribute to household sharing decisions, it is especially important to consider the
lineage of women in their roles as both donors and recipients. If shared lineage motivates
between-household sharing, then both women and men may have an interest in directing
shares to households of their co-lineage members, regardless of the recipient’s gender.
As was done in constructing the household relatedness matrix, both husbands’ and wives’
interests were taken into account in constructing the household-by-household matrix of
shared lineage. Each household was first assigned to the two lineages associated with that
household. Household dyads were then scored as sharing a lineage if either of the lineages
associated with the donor (row) household matched either of the two lineages associated
with the recipient (column) household. Any match between households was coded as a cell
value of 1; otherwise the cell value was coded as 0.9 This matrix is referred to as the
household shared lineage matrix. Of the 50,082 unique (unordered) household pairs, 5,101
or 10.2% shared a lineage.
Analyses
To compare the effects of lineage and relatedness on crew formation, the crew affiliation
matrix was regressed on the matrices of hunter shared lineage and hunter relatedness,
separately and together. Because the dependent variable (the crew affiliation matrix)
contains valued ties (i.e., the matrix cell values are continuous), ordinary least-square (OLS)
regression was employed. Each element of the crew affiliation matrix was regressed against
8Several different methods of calculating between-household relatedness were tried. The metric described here produced a better fit
(by AIC selection) to the sharing data than other methods, including taking the maximum degree of relatedness between any pair of
individuals (drawn one each from the two households), or the average across all such pairs.
9Husbands’ relatedness and lineage are more predictive of food sharing than are wives’, though both are significant. This difference is
not central to the argument presented here but is consistent with the ethnographic observation that both men and women have a voice
in sharing decisions.
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the corresponding element in the hunter relatedness matrix and the hunter shared lineage
matrix. Network data such as these violate the OLS assumption of independence of cases.
To control for non-independence of cases, a quadratic assignment procedure (QAP;
Krackhardt 1987, 1988) permutation test was performed on each model. For each test, 2,000
permutations were calculated using Dekker et al.’s (2003, 2007) semi-partialling plus
permutation method, as implemented in the sna (Butts 2008, 2009) package for R 2.10.1 (R
Core Development Team 2009).
To compare the effects of shared lineage and relatedness on between-household food-
sharing relationships, the food-sharing matrix was regressed on the matrices of household
relatedness and household shared lineage, separately and together. Because the dependent
variable is binary, matrix logistic regression was employed. Again, QAP permutation tests
were employed to control for non-independence of cases, as described above.
Results
Crew Affiliation
The results of the regressions of the crew affiliation matrix on the hunter shared lineage and
hunter relatedness matrices are presented in Table 1. The table presents standardized
regression coefficients primarily to aid in comparison of effects across the two independent
variables, but also because the dependent variable (the crew affiliation matrix fit using IPF)
is not itself expressed in interpretable units. This also simplifies comparisons with
previously published data (Alvard 2003: Table 4). The standardized coefficients express the
effect on normalized frequency of crew affiliation, in units of standard deviation, of a one-
standard-deviation change in the independent variable.
Model A shows that the degree of genetic relatedness between two hunters has a positive
effect on the frequency with which they affiliate in boat crews. All coefficients are
significant. A one-standard-deviation change in relatedness results in a 0.16 standard
deviation change in frequency of affiliation. Hunter relatedness explains about 2.5% of
variation in crew affiliation. The effect for shared lineage (Model B) is stronger than that for
relatedness, and it explains more than twice as much variance (5.3%). However, when both
hunter relatedness and hunter shared lineage are included in the same model, the effect of
relatedness drops significantly while the effect of shared lineage remains relatively strong.
More importantly, the inclusion of relatedness in a model with shared lineage explains little
additional variation beyond that explained by shared lineage alone (5.6% vs. 5.3%).
Food Sharing
The results of the regressions of the food-sharing matrix on the household relatedness and
household shared lineage matrices are presented in Table 2. Several methods have been
proposed for standardizing logistic regression coefficients (Menard 2004). The method used
here is Menard’s (1995, 2004: Eq. 5) fully standardized logistic regression coefficient. It is
interpreted as the effect (measured in units of standard deviation) on the log-odds of the
dependent variable of a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable.
Similarly, several different pseudo-R2 values have been suggested (Hagel and Mitchell
1992; Nagelkerke 1991). The R2 statistic used here is a widely used statistic proposed by
McFadden (1974) and is interpreted as the proportional reduction in error in predicting the
dependent variable contributed by the terms in the model compared with a model with no
predictors.
As with crew affiliation, both between-household relatedness (Model A) and household
shared lineage membership (Model B) have statistically significant independent effects.
However, in the case of between-household food sharing, it is relatedness rather than shared
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lineage that has the greater effect, as reflected both in the larger standardized regression
coefficient (0.40 vs. 0.20) and the larger pseudo-R2 value (0.16 vs. 0.09). More strikingly,
when both relatedness and shared lineage are included in the same regression (Model C), the
combined model is only slightly more predictive than the model (A) including relatedness
alone (pseudo-R2 0.18 vs. 0.16). Household shared lineage membership and household
relatedness are correlated with each other (matrix Pearson’s r=0.345), and in models A and
B each term captures part of the variance explained by the other (excluded) term. In the full
model this is reflected in a shift in the standardized coefficients.
Discussion
The pattern of crew affiliation observed in the 2006 crew participation data matches the
pattern found by Alvard (2003: Table 4) in his analysis of boat crew affiliation in 1999. His
results also showed that shared lineage membership independently explained more variance
than did genetic relatedness (R2=0.103 vs. 0.039, respectively). Similarly, he found that
combining shared lineage membership and genetic relatedness in the same model explained
little additional variance beyond that explained by shared lineage membership alone
(R2=0.107 vs. 0.103, respectively).10
The food-sharing data show the opposite pattern of that seen for crew affiliation. While
shared lineage and genetic relatedness both have independent effects, the combination of the
two explains little additional variation beyond that explained by genetic relatedness alone
(R2=0.178 versus 0.159, respectively). This is readily seen in Fig. 1, which presents the R2
(or pseudo-R2) values for regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2. Alvard’s (2003: Table 4)
results for crew affiliation during the 1999 hunting season are presented for comparison. In
the case of crew affiliation, both the 1999 hunting season and the 2006 hunting season data
show a similar pattern: shared lineage explains more variance than does genetic relatedness,
and the two together explain little more than does lineage alone. For food-sharing
relationships, this pattern is reversed: genetic relatedness is the better predictor, and lineage
explains little additional deviance than relatedness alone. What explains this difference?
Recall that in neither case does kin selection appear to be the adaptive mechanism
promoting the cooperative behavior itself. In the first case, cooperative hunting appears best
explained as synergistic mutualism (Maynard Smith 1983): men hunt cooperatively because
their individual per capita return rates are higher than those from other alternatives—
notably, small-boat fishing (Alvard and Nolin 2002). In the second case, reciprocal altruism
(Trivers 1971) appears to explain most between-household food sharing: individuals
disproportionately share with those who reciprocate, and this factor alone explains nearly
half the variance in between-household sharing relationships (Nolin 2010). The question
begged by the data presented here is therefore why lineage would be a better predictor of
partner choice in one setting (crew formation) and biological kinship a better predictor in the
other (food sharing).
Alvard’s (2003), explanation for the better predictive power of lineage in the context of crew
formation is that unilineal descent helps define discrete, boundedgroups of cooperators
which in turn facilitates the formation of whaling boat crews. If individuals were to try to
form crews based on the basis of biological kinship, this would produce many overlapping
bilateral kindreds but no clear groups (see also Alvard 2011). At the cost of excluding half
10During the 1999 season there were twenty active téna but only two jonson. Alvard’s (2003) crew affiliation analysis focused only
on the twenty téna crews. In 2006, there were 15 active jonson and 14 active téna. Crew participation data for both types of boats were
pooled in the present analysis. Thus, the 1999 data reflect only téna crew participation whereas the 2006 data reflect both téna and
jonson crew participation. Differences between téna and jonson crews may account for the lower variance explained in 2006
compared with 1999.
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their genetic kin they are better able to coordinate with others to form crews to realize the
benefits of mutualistic cooperation. Groups defined by shared lineage are also likely to share
the same set of norms governing how cooperative hunting is to be organized and how the
spoils are to be divided.
Food sharing, in contrast, does not necessitate the same degree of coordination as does
hunting crew formation. In this respect, the key distinction between food sharing and crew
formation is the degree of autonomy that individuals have in making their decisions. Recall
that food sharing in Lamalera is voluntary and discretionary, with no formally articulated
norms obliging individuals to share with particular other individuals. A household’s sharing
decisions can be made relatively independently of the choices made by other households. If
reciprocal partnerships are valued, then a household’s sharing decisions may be contingent
on the choices of another household. Although a household may have many of these
relationships, each such relationship is only dyadically contingent on the choices of the
partner households. Instead, most of the coordination of preferences in food-sharing
decisions may be within the household, between husband and wife. In the absence of the
need to coordinate sharing decisions outside the household above the level of the dyad,
individuals are better able to pursue kin preferences based on genetic relatedness.
In fact, one might wonder why lineage has any positive effect on food sharing at all. Food
sharing reduces risk and temporal variance in resources when covariance in harvest success
is low (Winterhalder 1986). The crew formation analysis suggests that lineage members are
more likely to be on the same boat together, meaning that lineage members are likely to
receive shares from the same boats. Lineage members are also likely to have corporate
shares in the same boats (Alvard 2002). This generally suggests high harvest covariance
among lineage members and should reduce their attractiveness as sharing partners. If, as
previously suggested (Nolin 2010), reciprocity is the main motivation for food sharing in
Lamalera, one might ask why households would share food with households of lineage
members at all. We might, in fact, predict a negative relationship between lineage co-
membership and sharing. The answer is that while lineage members do have high covariance
(and refrain from sharing) on days when they go out on the same boat, on days when a man
cannot go out, it is frequently his fellow crew members (who are also frequently lineage
members) that support him with donations of food.
Economists who study partner-choosing behavior such as this refer to it as matching. In
matching models a set of agents self-assort into groups (typically pairs) based on ordinal
preferences over the set of potential partners. The goal of much of this research is to
determine under what conditions a stable matching exists and can be identified (see, for
example, Chung 2000; Irving 1985; Tan 1991). Stability in this sense means that no pair (or
coalition) of actors currently not matched with each other would both prefer to be matched
with each other rather than with their current partners. The most robust result from this
research is that in two-sided, one-to-one matching models (such as a marriage market) there
is always at least one stablematching (Gale and Shapely 1962).11 Stable matchings may
exist in other settings, but this is not guaranteed (Roth and Sotomayor 1990).
Although most of the work in matching theory has focused on two-sided matching (Roth
and Sotomayor 1990), one important model called the Stable Roommate Problem deals with
matching when all actors are drawn from a single set. In these models pairs are formed
based on actors’ preferences regarding other members of the group. With as few as four
actors it is possible to specify sets of preferences that result in no stable matchings (Gale and
Shapely 1962). In simulations in which preferences are randomly assigned, the probability
11See Bergstrom and Real (2000) for an evolutionary application of two-sided matching theory to mate choice.
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of a stable matching decreases with increasing population size (Irving 1985). However,
when actors can be arranged along a single dimension such that those who are closer more
strongly prefer to be matched (a property called “single-peaked preference”), then there is a
unique stable matching (Bartholdi and Trick 1986).
From a matching standpoint, food-sharing relationships pose little problem: reciprocal
partners presumably select each other based on mutual preferences, but more importantly,
“matching” with one individual does not automatically preclude matching with another.
Crew formation, on the other hand, resembles a Stable Roommate Problem, but with crews
of eight or more rather than pairs. Imagine that each individual hunter has ordered
preferences regarding all other hunters with whom he might form a crew. If genetic kinship
influences these preferences, then the fact that no two individuals (besides full siblings) have
the same set of biological kin means that no two individuals are likely to have perfectly
congruent preferences. Two individuals may wish to crew together but may be in complete
disagreement about other preferred partners.
If natural selection has favored the evolution of a kin preference in cooperative partner
choice contexts, then it may be that unilineal cooperative groups represent a relatively stable
n-person matching, given individuals’ differing kin preferences. Although Bartholdi and
Trick’s (1986) stability condition has only been demonstrated for pairs, it may be that
restricting individuals’ preferences to unilineal kin produces the one-dimensional single-
peaked preferences that appear to facilitate stable matchings. Unilineal kinship assures that
at least some of every group member’s partner preferences are satisfied, and that every
member has some positive (however small it may be) relatedness to every other member.
Furthermore such a coalition or matching may be stable in the game theoretical sense that no
other group of similar size could be formed from the same population that satisfies its
members’ preferences as well as or better than the coalition defined by unilineal descent.
The functionalist explanation for unilineal descent suggests it serves to define large,
discretely bounded and mutually exclusive groups (van den Berghe 1979) who share a set of
norms that facilitates coordination (Alvard 2003). However, unilineal descent is not the only
possible mechanism by which large groups of people can be organized. Humans can, and do,
also organize themselves into large, mutually exclusive groups on the basis of other criteria,
such as geographic boundaries, age-sets, initiation rites, or other markers that distinguish
group members from non-members. One reason lineage systems may be so common is that
they retain a higheraverage degree of relatedness among group members (van den Berghe
1979), better satisfying individuals’ preferences to assort with kin.
Why, then, choose patriliny over matriliny (or vice versa)? At face value, the two systems
ought to be equally effective at organizing large, distinct groups of highly related
individuals. Figure 2 suggests why either patriliny or matriliny might be favored. The two
identical pedigrees are shaded according to patrilineal (upper panel) or matrilineal (lower
panel) descent. In either case, the sex through which descent is reckoned has a higher mean
within-lineage relatedness to co-lineage members of the same sex than does the other sex.
For example, in the pedigrees presented in Fig. 2, the patrilineally related men in the upper
panel have a mean degree of relatedness of r=0.35, while the women in the same patriline
have a mean degree of relatedness of r=0.275. Under matriliny (the lower panel) these
figures are reversed. The sex from which cooperative groups are formed will have higher
within-group relatedness when descent is reckoned through that sex. In economic terms, the
form of lineal descent corresponding to the cooperatively organized sex will better satisfy
their kin preferences, and may result in more stable matchings when groups are formed.
Thus, when local ecology favors cooperation among males, then patriliny may be the
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preferred mode of unilineal descent; where cooperation among women is favored, matriliny
may be preferred.
These examples are speculative, and without further empirical support, as well as more
formal modeling, this matching theory explanation for unilineal descent systems may remain
less convincing than other explanations. However, it is also not mutually exclusive of other,
previously proposed hypotheses that use parental investment, reproductive skew,
inheritance, and paternity uncertainty to explain patriliny and matriliny. Several mechanisms
might be operating simultaneously tofavor one mode of descent over another. In this
context, the ability of unilineal descent systems to satisfy some of all members’ preferences
to affiliate with kin may be a contributing factor to the stability and ubiquity of these forms
of descent.
Summary
In Lamalera, kin preference appears to manifest itself differently in different economic
settings. When households make food-sharing decisions, they are free to do so relatively
autonomously from the decisions of other households; consequently, genetic relatedness is a
better predictor than lineage in this setting. When men make decisions about which boat
crews to join, their choices are contingent on those made by others, and shared lineage
membership is a better predictor than genetic relatedness in this setting. The key difference
between the two is the degree to which individuals are free to pursue their kin preferences
autonomously versus the degree to which they must coordinate those preferences with
others. Unilineal descent offers a normative solution to the problem of coordinating multiple
individuals’ conflicting kin preferences by defining discrete groups of cooperating
individuals, and this solution may be stable in the sense that it satisfies at least some of the
preferences of all its members. Given that unilineal descent of some form is favored in the
setting of cooperative hunting in Lamalera, patrilineal descent may be favored over
matrilineal descent because it increases the mean degree of within-group relatedness for
men.
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Variation in hunters’ crew affiliations and between-household food-sharing relationships
explained by genetic relatedness, shared lineage, or both. Crew affiliation data from 1999
are from Alvard (2003: Table 4). Numbers on the y-axis and above the bars provide the R2
or pseudo-R2 values. Note that in the case of crew affiliation, genetic relatedness adds little
explanatory power beyond that provided by lineage, while in the case of food sharing,
lineage adds little explanatory power beyond that provided by genetic relatedness
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Two pedigrees shaded according to lineage membership. Upper panel: patrilineal lineage
membership. Lower panel: matrilineal lineage membership. The sex through which descent
is reckoned has higher mean within-lineage relatedness. Mean relatedness of patrilineally
related men: r=0.35; mean relatedness of patrilineally related women r=0.275. Mean
relatedness of matrilineally related men: r=0.275; mean relatedness of matrilineally related
women: r=0.35
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Ordinary least-squares matrix regression of fitted crew affiliation matrix on relatedness and shared lineage
Model Independent Variable Standardized Coefficient ± S.E. pa R2b
A Relatedness 0.1595±0.0065 <0.0001 0.0254
B Shared Lineage 0.2301±0.0064 <0.0001 0.0529
C Relatedness 0.0602±0.0074 <0.0001 0.0556
Shared Lineage 0.2003±0.0074 <0.0001
a
QAP permutation tests using Dekker’s (Dekker et al. 2003) semi-partialling plus permutation method with 2,000 iterations
b
Model significance: Model A: F(1,23003)=1,2 86, p<0.0001; Model B: F(1,23003)= 600.8, p<0.0001; Model C: F(2,23002)=67 8.2, p<0.0001 ’















Logistic matrix regression of food-sharing network on between-household relatedness and household shared
lineage
Model Independent Variable Standardized Coefficient±S.E.a pb R2c
A Relatedness 0.3995±0.0059 <0.0001 0.1593
B Shared Lineage 0.2020±0.0037 <0.0001 0.0913
C Relatedness 0.2711±0.0058 <0.0001 0.1777
Shared Lineage 0.2247±0.0092 <0.0001
a
Menard’s (1995) fully standardized logistic regression coefficient
b
QAP permutation tests using Dekker’s (Dekker et al. 2003) semi-partialling plus permutation method with 2,000 iterations
c
McFadden’s (1974) pseudo-R2for logistic regression: the proportion of residual deviance (RD) in an intercept-only (null) model explained by the
full model, calculated as (RDnull - RDfull)/RDnull
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